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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court of Appeals should continue to uphold the valid-
ity of a second marriage in the absence of strong evidence that a prior
marriage had not been dissolved, but in so doing the Court should use
language which would be consistent with the actual standard of evi-
dence required to rebut this presumption.
Joseph Howard
Procedure-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-EFFECT OF NONRESIDENT
MOTORIST SERVICE ON TOLLING PROVISIONS. In Bergman v. Turpin,'
Mitchell E. Bergman, plaintiff, and Iford L. Turpin, defendant, were
involved in an automobile accident in Botetourt County, Virginia on
May 30, 1959, whereby-the plaintiff sustained personal injuries. At the
time of the accident the defendant was a resident of Virginia but shortly
thereafter, on November 1, 1959 he became a resident of the District
of Columbia. The plaintiff was, at all times pertinent to the controversy,
a resident of North Carolina.
On May 29, 1961, plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant
in the proper federal court in Virginia. Service was made on the de-
fendant pursuant to the Virginia nonresident motorist statutes.2 The
1. 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
2. VA. CoD- Amt., Sec. 8-67.1 (1950).
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by article 6
(46-110 et seq.) of chapter 3 of Title 46 as evidenced by his operation, either in person
or by agent or employee, of a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer hereunder, or the
operation by a nonresident, either in person or by an agent or employee, of a motor
vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer in this State otherwise than under such article, shall be
deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicles or his successors in office to be the true and lawful at-
torney of such nonresident upon whom may be served all lawful process against and
notice to such nonresident in any action or proceeding against him growing out of
any accident or collision in which such nonresident or his agent or employee may be
involved while operating a motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer in this Common-
wealth, and such acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that
any such process against or notice to him which is served shall be of the same legal
force and validity as if served upon him personally in the county or corporation in
which such accident or collision occurred or in which a resident defendant, if any,
resides.
The term 'nonresident' includes any person who though resident when the motor
vehicle accident or collision occurred, has been continuously outside the State for at




court dismissed the plaintiff's action without prejudice because of im-
proper venue.
On August 22, 1963, plaintiff instituted a second suit on the same
cause of action in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County, Virginia and
had the defendant served at his Washington, D. C. address in accordance
with Sections 8-67.1 and 8-67.2 of the Virginia Code.3 The defendant
then filed a plea of the statute of limitations on the grounds that the
plaintiff had not instituted his action within two years as required by
statute.4 Plaintiff filed a reply to defendant's plea alleging that Section
8-33 of the Code tolled the running of the statute of limitations as long
as the defendant resided outside the state of Virginia, and thus his
action was not barred.5
The court held that Section 8-33 was not applicable, since under the
nonresident motorist statutes the plaintiff could have obtained service
of process on the defendant at any time within two years from the date
of his cause of action and thus the plaintiff's claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. The case was dismissed with prejudice and the
plaintiff was granted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN., Sec. 8-67.2 (1950).
Service of such process or notice shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
or notice, together with a fee of three dollars, plus one dollar additional for each
defendant over one to be served, in the hands of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
or in his office in the city of Richmond, Virginia, and such service shall be sufficient
upon the nonresident, provided that notice of such service and a copy of the process
or notice are forthwith sent by registered mail, with registered delivery receipt re-
quested, by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to the defendant and an affidavit of
compliance herewith by'the Commissioner, or some one designated by him for that
purpose and having knowledge of such compliance, shall be forthwith filed with the
papers in the action.
The mailing required by this section shall be to the last known post office of the
defendants but if there is left with the Commissioner, along with the notice of process,
an affidavit of the plaintiff that he does not know and is unable to ascertain any post
office address of the defendant or defendants, service of the notice or process shall be
valid without the mailing otherwise required by this section.
3. Ibid.
4. VA. CODE Amix., Sec. 8-24 (1950). Which provides in part: "Every action for
personal injuries shall be brought within two years next after the right to bring the
same shall have accrued. * * "
5. VA. CoDE A x., Sec. 8-23 (1950). Which provides in part: "When any such right
as is mentioned in this chapter shall accrue against a person who had before resided
in this State, if such person shall, by departing without the same * * or by any
other indirect way or means obstruct the prosecution of such right, the time that
such obstruction may have continued shall not be computed as any part of the time
within such right might or ought to have been prosecuted. * * *"
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court stating that where the plaintiff has a method of substituted
service available, whereby the defendant can be served and a valid per-
sonal judgment obtained, his remedy is complete and the tolling statute is
not applicable.6 The court further held that the case of Flicken's Ex'r v.
Carrington,7 relied on by the plaintiff in support of his contention, was
decided long before the first Virginia nonresident motorist statute was
enacted and was no longer controlling. 8
There are basically two views followed by courts in determining
whether or not the tolling statutes apply to nonresident defendants. The
minority view is based upon a literal interpretation of the statutes.9 The
theory of the minority is that if the legislatures had intended the non-
resident motorist acts to be an exception to the tolling statutes they
would have made exceptions therein; and since they did not, these
statutes must be applied with strict interpretations.'
The majority follows a more liberal view that where there is a means
of substituted service giving a court personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, such as the nonresident motorist statutes, there is no reason
to apply the tolling statutes. In Reed v. Rosenfeld" the court stated
that it would greatly prejudice the defendant's right to allow stale
claims against him where the witnesses might have died or disappeared
and documentary evidence might have been lost or destroyed. The
majority not only give a broader interpretation to the nonresident
motorist statutes, but also try to adapt them to their intended purpose,12
maintaining that where the plaintiff's remedy is complete and unaffected
by the defendant's absence the tolling statutes on nonresident de-
fendants do not apply.' 3
While both of the above stated views have merit, the reasoning
6. Bergman v. Turpin, supra note 1, at 542.
7. 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 219, 226 (1878).
8. VA. CoDE ANN., supra note 2.
9. Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N. J. Misc. 119, 25 A. 2d 430 (1942); Macri v. Flaherty,
115 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. 1953), which provides for the literal interpretation of statutes
where there are no exceptions provided therein. Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308
P.2d 1021 (1957).
10. Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 NE.2d 139 (1950); Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J.
295, 196 A.2d 532 (1963).
11. 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947).
12. Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill.App. 504, 15 NE.2d 17 (1938), in this case the
purpose of the nonresident motorist statute was interpreted as an exception to the
tolling statute.
13. Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938).
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CURRENT DECISIONS
adopted by the decisions in line with the majority seems to be better.
The primary fault of the minority view is that it fails to consider the
context of the tolling statute in its relation to the whole concept of
justice. Men are entitled to a speedy and fair adjudication of their rights.
By allowing actions to be delayed for indefinite periods the door is left
open for fraud and deceit. Permitting the tolling statutes to operate
where the plaintiff has other means of service could cause great hard-
ship, for a defendant might not know for years that he had even been
charged with negligence. By considering the implications of a literal
interpretation the majority view reaches a solution which is fairer to all
parties concerned.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the instant case adopted
the majority rule. The decision of Bergman v. Turpin thus adopts a
more rational interpretation of the law, and sets a precedent which
should be easy to follow in future Virginia cases. However, in making
this exception to the tolling statute the court could have perhaps
strengthened its argument by using Wilson v. Kootze4 and Brown 'v.
Butler.'5 These cases support the majority rule and are based on an
early opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall which stated that the
plaintiff's rights to a suit or action must have been "actually or con-
structively obstructed" before the tolling statute applies. This would
have given the court a sounder answer to the plaintiff's contention that
the Ficklin's Case should apply, and also would have provided them
with somewhat of a precedent for their decision in Virginia.
Mark S. Dray
Federal Procedre-DrwvRsiTY JURisDICTION-UNiNCoRPoRATED LA-
BOR UNIONS. In United Steelworkers of America v. Bouligny,l
Respondent, a North Carolina corporation, commenced an action in a
state court seeking damages for defamation. The Petitioner, an unin-
corporated labor union whose principal place of business is in Pennsyl-
vania, removed the case to a federal district court asserting diversity of
citizenship as a basis for removal.
14. 7, Cranch (11 U. S.) 202 (1812).
15. 87 Va. 621,13 S.. 71 (1891).
1. 86 S. Ct. 272 (1965).
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